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Case No. 20160502-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ANH TUAM PHAM, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Pham, 2016 UT App 105, 372 P.3d 734 (Addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (West 
2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner Anh Pham shot Luis Menchaca in the groin at point-blank 
range. Luis testified at the preliminary hearing, and Pham cross-examined 
him without limitation. By the time of trial, Luis had returned to Mexico. 
Despite diligent efforts, the State could not locate him. The trial court found 
Luis unavailable and admitted his preliminary hearing testimony over 
Pham' s confrontation objection. 
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Pham appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that, 
under Crawford v. Washington, Pham' s right to confront Luis was satisfied 
because Luis was unavailable and Pham had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine him at the preliminary hearing. 
Pham argues that a preliminary hearing can almost never afford an 
adequate opportunity for cross-examination. But in a long, unbroken line of 
cases, both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held the 
opposite. And the court of appeals here did not foreclose the possibility 
that a particular preliminary hearing might not afford such an opportunity. 
It correctly held that this case fell outside that possibility. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. This Court granted review on the following question: "Whether 
the court of appeals erred in concluding Petitioner had failed to 
demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against 
him was violated by the presentation of the victim[']s preliminary hearing 
testimony at his h·ial." Order, September 12, 2016. 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the court of appeals' decision 
for correctness. Brierley v. Layton City, 2016 UT 46, if 18, _ P.3d _. 
-2-
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, . statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum B: 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI; 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 
Luis Menchaca and his girlfriend, Donna Olmeno, went to a 7-Eleven 
to buy Slurpees. R291:6. There, they saw Anh Tuam Pham "bullying" two 
boys on bikes. R292:15. Pham and his friend Yeth Yan-who had been 
partying and "ran out of beer" -had gone to the 7-Eleven to resupply. 
R293:61-62; R292:43, 57, 66. The four were not acquainted. R291:7. 
From the moment they arrived, Olmeno had a "bad vibe, like there 
was going to be problems," because she saw Pham "picking on" the boys. 
R292:18, 21, 35. As Menchaca and Olmeno entered the store, the boys asked 
them for a ride. Wanting "no drama, no nothing," Menchaca said no. 
R292:21, R291 :8. 
Once back outside, standing next to his truck, Menchaca watched 
Pham harass the boys again. R291:8. The boys again asked Menchaca for a 
ride. Id; R292:22. Pham, who was only a few feet away, turned around and 
asked Menchaca if he "wanted problems too." R292:22, 39; R291:8-9. 
-3-
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Menchaca said, "No." Id. Pham repeated two or three times, "[D]o you want 
problems too," and Menchaca repeated each time: "No, I don't want 
problems." R292:39. 
Suddenly, Pham pulled a gun out of his pocket and pointed it at 
Menchaca. R291:9. Menchaca's girlfriend screamed, "[A]re you going to 
shoot him? Are you going to shoot him when there is cops across the 
sh·eet?" R292:24. Pham pointed the gun at Menchaca's groin. State Exh. 4b. 
"[W]atch me," he said before shooting Menchaca. R292:24. 
The single bullet produced three wounds, one right above 
Menchaca's penis on his right side, one through his scrotum on his left side, 
and one in his leg, where the bullet is permanently lodged. State Ex. 3; 
R291:9-10; R293:103-04. 
While Menchaca jumped up and down, Pham hopped into his white 
minivan and put it in reverse. R292:9-11, 26, 49-52, 94, 99; R293:71. Two 
police officers-guns drawn-chased after Pham yelling "stop, police stop, 
police, stop now." R292:51-53, 78-80, 95. But Pham just "sped off." R292:94. 
Menchaca began to feel dizzy. R291:11. He sat down and stuck his 
hand into the hole in his pants; it came out bloody. R291:11; R292:96. When 
the officers found hiin, Menchaca was "holding between his legs." R292:96. 
They called the ambulance, and Menchaca was h·ansported to the hospital, 
-4-
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where he stayed for three days. 291:11; R292:96-97. The entire episode was 
caught on tape by the outdoor 7-Eleven security camera. State Exh. 4a, 4b. 
Pham and Yan ditched their minivan in the adjoining neighborhood. 
R292:53. They stole a family's running SUV with the father chasing after 
them. R292:53-56; 293:10-14. The duo then threw Pham's striped shirt into 
some bushes, drove a few blocks, and abandoned the stolen SUV around 
the corner from Yan's fourplex-where they had been "partying" earlier in 
the evening. R293:ll, 13-14; R292:55, 66. 
Police officers found Pham at that fourplex later that night. R293:33. 
He was dressed in different clothes than on the security footage and as 
reported by eyewitnesses. R292:70, 82; R293:22. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Preliminary hearing. Four months later, Pham' s victim testified at the 
preliminary hearing. Menchaca identified Pham and testified that Pham 
was harassing the two boys on bicycles when Pham pulled out his gun and 
shot him. R291:7-9. Menchaca also testified about his injuries. R291:9-ll, 
12-14. He testified that he felt dizzy, bled from his groin wounds, was in the 
hospital for three days after the shooting, could not walk without pain for 
two weeks, could not sleep at night without pain in the sole of his foot, 
believed the bullet hit a nerve in his leg that caused problems with his big 
-5-
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toe, returned to the hospital after two weeks to have x-rays because of the 
pain, and could still feel the bullet lodged in his leg. R291:12-14 . 
.Pham's attorney cross-examined Menchaca. R291:14. The State's 
direct examination spans eleven pages, R291:4-14; Pham's cross-
exainination spans thirteen R291:14-26. He asked Menchaca about his 
background, marital status, failure to pay hospital bills, interactions with 
police the day of the incident, relationship to those involved, ability to 
perceive, memory, and details of the incident. Id. The State did not object to 
any of counsel's questions, and the trial court placed no limitations on 
counsel's cross-examination. Id. In cross-examination, Pham's attorney 
discovered that aside from harassing the two boys on bikes, Pham also 
pushed them just before shooting Menchaca. R291:20. 
Trial. By the time of trial, Menchaca was no longer in Utah. The State 
tracked Menchaca to Mexico - first to Minchocan and then to Guanajua to -
but, even working with the Los Angeles Police Department, Foreign 
Prosecution/Interpol, the State was unable to discover Menchaca's 
whereabouts or to procure his presence at trial. R104-108. Pham did not 
then, and does not now, dispute that Menchaca was unavailable at trial. 
During trial, over Pham' s objection, the court allowed the State to 
read Menchaca's preliminary hearing testimony into the record because 
-6-
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Menchaca was unavailable to testify and Pham had cross-examined him at 
the prelhninary hearing. R292:41; R134-136. 
The jury found Pham guilty of discharge of a firearm with serious 
bodily injury, receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, obstructing 
justice, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop. R274. The trial 
court sentenced Pham to concurrent prison terms of five years to life for 
felony discharge of a firearm; one to fifteen years for receiving or 
transferring a stolen vehicle; one to fifteen years for obstructing justice; and 
zero to five years for failure to stop or respond at the command of an officer. 
R278-79. 
Court of Appeals' decision. Pham timely appealed, arguing that 
admitting the victim's preliminary hearing testimony violated his 
confrontation right because preliminary hearings were so limited in scope 
that they could not afford an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.1 
Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ,I,I9-10. Pham argued that three aspects of 
preliminary hearings rendered them inadequate opportunities for cross-
examination: (1) the magistrate's limited ability to determine credibility; (2) 
1 Pham also argued in the court of appeals that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of discharge of a firearm with serious bodily 
injury. Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ,I8. The court of appeals rejected that 
claim, and he does not seek certiorari on that issue. 
-7-
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the magistrate's duty to draw all reasonable inferences in the prosecution's 
favor; and (3) the State's low burden of proof. Id. at ,r,r13-14, 16; see generally 
State v. Jones, 2016 UT 4, 365 P.3d 1212 ( discussing preliminary hearing 
standards). 
The court of appeals-consistent with its own, this Court's, and the 
United States Supreme Court's precedent-disagreed. Pham, 2016 UT App 
105, if ifll-12 (citing State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 314 P.3d 1014). The 
court explained that neither its own precedent "nor Crawford [v. Washington] 
state a blanket rule that an opportunity to cross-examine a witness at a 
preliminary hearing will always, as a matter of law, satisfy a defendant's 
right to confrontation." Id. at if 12. "Rather," the court continued, it 
understood "those cases to set forth the general proposition that it is possible 
for the cross-examination opportunity at a preliminary hearing to satisfy 
that right." Id. Because Pham did not allege that his motive changed 
between preliminary hearing and trial, the trial court did not li1nit his cross-
examination in any way, and Pham did "not identify any shortcomings in 
the cross-examination" at preliminary hearing, the court of appeals held 
that he did not show a confrontation violation. Id. at ifif18-19 & n.4. 
The court of appeals explained that the characteristics of preliminary 
hearings do not "limit the ability of a defendant to conduct a full cross-
-8-
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~-
examination" because they "hnpose[d] no obvious structural limitation on 
the scope or depth of cross-examination" in that setting. Pham, 2016 UT 
App 105, iJ17. Thus, the court could not "conclude that cross-examinations 
conducted within Utah's preliminary hearing framework can never satisfy a 
defendant's" confrontation rights. Id. (citing State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 
(Utah 1981). The court likewise refused to decide "whether the inverse 
[was] true" - that is, whether prelhninary hearings always satisfy a 
defendant's confrontation rights. Id. at ,I18. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pham argues that because a preliminary hearing 1s limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists to bind a defendant over for 
trial, there is less motive to cross-examine, which renders that prior 
opportunity inadequate to satisfy the confrontation right. This position 
contradicts over a century of precedent from the United States Supreme 
Court, this Court, and the court of appeals. Pham has provided no 
compelling reason to depart from this precedent, particularly where the 
United States Supreme Court has considered- and rejected- the sort of 
arguments he makes. Under this long, unbroken line of precedent, Pham's 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary hearing 
-9-
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satisfied his right to confront him when he became unavailable to testify at 
trial. 
Preliminary hearings in Utah-notwithstanding their limited 
purpose-retain the relevant attributes that the Supreme Court has held 
make the1n "trial-like": witnesses are placed under oath, testify at a 
recorded hearing in front of a judge, the defendant is represented by 
counsel, and he has a rule-based right to cross-examine. And defense 
counsel is animated by the same motive and interest-to further the 
defendant's chances of success- at preliminary hearing no less than at trial, 
notwithstanding a state constitutional amend1nent permitting the State to 
present reliable hearsay at preliminary hearings. Further, the concerns that 
Pham points to- such as a judge limiting cross-examination- do not apply 
to his case. 
The correct rule is essentially a mirror image of Pham' s proposed 
rule. Pham argues that preliminary hearings as a general rule cannot afford 
an adequate opportunity for cross-exa1nination "absent exceptional 
circumstances." In reality, preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
declarant is generally admissible absent exceptional circumstances, such as 
where a magistrate significantly limits cross-examination on credibility 
issues. 
-10-
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Preliminary hearings can provide an adequate opportunity 
for cross-examining a witness who is unavailable to testify at 
trial. 
Pham argues that the court of appeals erroneously held that cross-
exa1nination at preliminary hearings takes place "under the same motive 
and interest" as cross-examination at trial because the precedent on which 
the court of appeals relied for this proposition- this Court's decision in 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981)-was later overruled by state 
constitutional amendment. 2 Aplt.Br. 12-16. He also asserts that preliminary 
hearings can almost never satisfy the confrontation clause because of their 
2 Pham cites to this amendment as evidence of a confrontation 
violation, Pet.Br. 5-6, 17, but his claim is made entirely under the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. at 12-13, 16, 26-27. Although he briefly references the state 
constitution, id. at 13, he makes no separate argument regarding it, and his 
constitutional argument relies solely on cases addressing the Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause. See id. at 7, 12-28. He does not argue 
that the state constitution was violated; rather, he asserts that a state 
constitutional change shows a federal violation. Id. at 5-6, 17. And the Court 
of Appeals addressed only a federal claim. See Pham, 2016 UT App 105, if 13-
19. This Court has "repeatedly refrained from engaging in state 
constitutional law analysis unless 'an argument for different analyses under 
the state and federal constitutions is briefed'." See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 
47 ifl6, 164 P.3d 397, 405 (quoting State v. LaferhJ, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 
(Utah 1988)). Because Pham has not separately briefed a state constitutional 
claim-which would be unpreserved at any rate-the State confines its 
analysis to the Sixth Amendment. 
-11-
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"very limited" purpose of establishing probable cause,. which does "not 
allow ... for purposeful and rigorous cross-examination." Id. at 14, 16. 
These factors, according to him, render preliminary hearings all but per se 
inadequate opportunities for cross-examination. Id. at 22. Pham is mistaken. 
A long, unbroken line of decisions from both the United States Supreme 
Court and this Court show that preliminary hearing testimony can be 
ad1nissible at h·ial where the declarant is unavailable. This Court should 
hew to that precedent, as Pham offers no compelling reason to depart from 
it. 
A. Preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable declarant 
has long been admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an 
accused's right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" at trial. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, if 9, 218 P.3d 590. 
But this right is not absolute. The Confrontation Clause applies only to 
"testimonial" hearsay. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). A 
hearsay statement is "testimonial" if, in making it, the declarant "bears 
testimony" against a defendant. Id. at 51. Testimonial hearsay includes, 
among other things, "prior testimony at a preliminary hearing." Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51, 59, 68. 
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But even testimonial hearsay is admissible at trial if (1) the declarant 
is unavailable to testify and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant about the prior statements. Id. at 68. Prior 
testimony-whether given at a prior trial or a preliminary hearing- has 
long been admissible where these conditions are met. Id. at 57 (citing 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 241 (1895)); see also State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 403 (1994). 
Unavailability is not at issue here. The trial court found the victim 
unavailable, R292:41, R134-136, and Pham does not contest that ruling. 
As to the second require1nent, the Sixth Amendment guarantees only 
the opportunity to cross-examine. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination") (emphasis added). As this Court 
has long recognized, even where a defendant "may have elected to forgo 
cross-examination" that "does not mean that the opportunity was not 
available." State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986); see State v. Pecht, 
2002 UT 41, ~39, 48 P.3d 931; State v. Jolley, 571 P.2d 582, 586 (Utah 1977); see 
also Barger v. Oklahoma, 238 F. App'x. 343, 346-47 (10th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Williams, 116 F. App'x. 890, 891 (9th Cir. 2004); Simmons v. State, 234 
S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Williams, 181 P.3d 1035, 1061 
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(Cal. 2008); People v. Yost, 749 N.W.2d 753, 774-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); 
State v. Artis, 215 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
Thus, satisfying the Sixth Amendment confrontation right does not 
require that cross-examination will take place at all, let alone "cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the 
defense might wish." United States v. Owens 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) 
(citations omitted); Pecht, 2002 UT 41, ,I39; see also People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 
1074, 1126 (Cal. 2010) ("Nothing in Crawford casts doubt on the continuing 
vitality of Owens."). Whether a prior opportunity is "adequate" depends on 
the facts of a case. 
Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have long held 
that the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness may be 
admissible at trial. 3 More than a century ago, the United States Supreme 
3 The Supreme Court excluded the preliminary hearing testimony of 
an unavailable witness in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1965). But the 
problems in Pointer-that Pointer lacked counsel at the preliminary hearing 
and the government made no attempt to procure the out-of-state witness to 
testify at trial-are not present here. Other Supreme Court cases excluding 
preliminary hearing testimony on confrontation grounds have generally 
involved circumstances- also not present here-where the declarant was 
not truly unavailable. See id.; see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) 
(preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible where State did not seek 
presence); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (witness unavailable 
due to negligence of government); see also State v. Onislwr, 510 P.2d 929 
(Utah 1973). (preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible at trial where 
State had not proven unavailability). 
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Court addressed this possibility in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 
(1985). Mattox was convicted of a murder in Indian territory. Id.at 239. His 
conviction was reversed on appeal, and he was tried a second time, which 
resulted in a hung jury. Id. at 251. By the time of his third trial, two of the 
witnesses against him had died. Id. at 240. The trial court permitted those 
witnesses' prior testimonies-in the form of reporter's notes-to be read at 
Mattox's third trial. Id. He was convicted and appealed, claiming that 
admission of this prior testimony violated his confrontation rights. Id. 
In holding the testimony admissible, the Supreme Court noted that 
"the authority in favor of the admissibility of such testimony, where the 
defendant was present either at the examination of the deceased witness before 
a committing magistrate, or upon a former trial of the same case, is 
overwhelming." Id. at 242 (emphasis added). In support, the court favorably 
cited more than a dozen lower court cases, including one in which "the 
substance of a deceased witness' testimony given at a preliminary 
examination was held to be admissible." Id. at 242 (citing United States v. 
Macomb, 5 McLean 286, Fed. Cas. No. 15,702). 
The court explained that the "primary object" of the confrontation 
clause was "to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used 
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination 
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of the witness." Id. at 242. Prior sworn testimony, the court explained, is 
not the evil the confrontation clause targets. Id. The court understood that 
its holding would "deprive[]" a defendant "of the advantage of that 
personal presence of the witness before the jury which the law has designed 
for his protection," but noted that the general rule "must occasionally give 
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case," and 
that letting the guilty walk free in all cases where their accusers were no 
longer available "would be carrying his constitutional protection to an 
unwarrantable extent. The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the 
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may 
be preserved to the accused." Id. at 243. Thus, confrontation was satisfied 
"in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and 
subjecting hhn to the ordeal of cross-examination." Id. at 244 (emphasis 
added). 
Mattox's holding has been reaffirmed for more than 100 years. 
Though the language of Mattox itself was broad enough to include 
preliminary hearings, the Supreme Court first addressed preliminary 
hearings specifically nearly half a century ago in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 165 (1970). 
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In Green, Porter sold marijuana to an undercover officer. 399 U.S. at 
151. After Porter was arrested, he named Green as his supplier. Id. Porter 
later testified for the State at Green's preliminary hearing, where he was 
cross-examined by defense counsel. Id. At trial, Porter again testified, but 
became "markedly evasive and uncooperative," claiming that he had 
forgotten who his supplier was. Id. at 151-52 (citation and quotation 
omitted). The court admitted Porter's preliminary hearing testimony to 
impeach him. Id. at 152. The California Supreme Court held that admitting 
Porter's prelhninary hearing testimony violated Green's confrontation 
rights. Id. at 153. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The court acknowledged 
that one virtue of having a witness testify at trial was that the jury could 
"observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement," which 
would aid "the jury in assessing his credibility." Id. at 158. But the court 
cautioned that this direct observation was not the be-all and end-all of the 
Confrontation Clause-while it "may be true that a jury would be in a better 
position to evaluate the truth of the prior statement if it could somehow be 
whisked magically back in time to witness" it, the Constitution did not 
require that. Id. at 160-61. 
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Granted, Porter actually testified at Green's trial, and was subject to 
cross-examination on his prior statements. Id. at 161-62. But the Court's 
holding was not limited to that circumstance. The Court explained that 
"Porter's preliminary hearing testimony was admissible" under the 
Confrontation Clause even if Porter had not testified at trial, because his 
preliminary hearing statement was "given under circumstances closely 
approximating those that surround a typical h·ial," which included: 
• Porter was under oath; 
• Green was represented by counsel; 
• Green's counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine 
Porter on his statements to police, without any significant 
limitation; and 
• the proceedings were held in front of a judge. 
Id. at 165-66. Under these circumstances, the preliminary hearing was not 
"significantly different from an actual trial" for confrontation purposes, and 
the preliminary hearing testimony would have been admissible even if 
Porter had been unavailable to testify at trial. Id. (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. 
257). 
It is true that Green was decided before both Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56 (1980) and Crawford, which set out the current confrontation 
requirements. But both Roberts and Crawford show Green's continuing 
validity. 
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Roberts was charged with check forgery and possession of stolen 
credit cards from a Bernard Isaacs. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. One of the 
witnesses for Roberts at the preliminary hearing was Anita Isaacs-
Bernard's daughter-who let Roberts stay at her apartment. Id. Anita 
denied giving Roberts permission to use her father's checks and credit 
cards. Id. At trial, Roberts claimed that Anita had given him the financial 
instruments "with the understanding that he could use them." Id. at 59. 
Anita was not available to testify at trial, so the State introduced her 
preliminary hearing testimony to rebut Roberts' claim. Id. 
Like the California court in Green, the Ohio Supreme Court in Roberts 
held that prior preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible under the 
Confrontation Clause because there was "little incentive to cross-examine a 
witness at a preliminary hearing, where the ultimate issue is only probable 
cause." Id. at 61 (citation and quotation omitted). The Supreme Court 
reversed and re-affirmed Green, explaining that the preliminary hearing 
afforded an "adequate opportunity to cross-examine." Id. at 73 (citation 
omitted). 
True, the Roberts court also held that hearsay statements of an 
unavailable declarant were admissible under the Confrontation Clause so 
long as they bore "adequate indicia of reliability." Id. at 66 (quotation 
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omitted). And the Supreme Court later abandoned this test in Crawford in 
favor of the two-element test of (1) unavailability and (2) prior opportunity 
for cross-examination. 541 U.S. at 60. 
But Crawford itself noted that Roberts' result likely survived under the 
Crawford test. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58. This was so because, despite reciting 
the "reliable hearsay" test that Crawford disavowed, the Roberts court 
"hew[ ed] closely to the traditional line" by admitting "testimony from a 
preliminary hearing at which the defendant had cross-examined the 
witness." And like Roberts, Crawford re-affirmed Green and Mattox. Id. at 57 
(citing Green and Mattox for proposition that "preliminary hearing 
testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity 
to cross-examine"). 
This Court has also repeatedly affirmed the admission of an 
unavailable witness's preliminary hearing testimony, most recently this 
year. Mackin v. State, 2016 UT 47, ,Iif38-42, _ P.3d _; Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
402-03; State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913-14 (Utah 1988); State v. Brooks, 638 
P.2d 537, 540-42 (Utah 1981). For example, in Brooks. There, four transients 
fought each other in the "hobo jungle" over $14. Brooks, 638 P.2~ at 538. 
Two of the men were charged with aggravated assault, and the other two 
testified against them at a preliminary hearing, where they were cross-
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examined. Id. When the victims were later declared unavailable, their prior 
testimony came in at trial over Broo_ks' s confrontation objection. Id. 
This Court affirmed under the Roberts reliability test-which 
governed confrontation clause questions at the time-but explained that the 
reliability of the testimony sprang from a prelhninary hearing, "with all its 
formalities and protections." Id. at 540-41. And it rejected Brooks' s 
argument that preliminary hearings did not afford an adequate opportunity 
to cross-examine based on the limited purpose of the hearing, explaining 
that the defense's "motive and interest are the same" at both preliminary 
hearing and trial- to establish the defendant's innocence. Id. at 541. 
This Court also held prior preliminary hearing testimony admissible 
in both Lovell, 758 P.2d at 913-14, and Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402-03, which 
were decided under Roberts. And this Court most recently affirmed the 
admission of prior preliminary hearing testimony under Crawford in Mackin, 
2016 UT 47, if if 40-42. 
The court of appeals has followed suit. See State v. Goins, 2016 UT 
App 57, 370 P.3d 942, cert. granted, 384 P.3d 567; West Valley City v. Kent, 
2016 UT App 8, 366 P.3d 415; State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 314 P.3d 
1014. This Court has approved this course. See Mackin, 2016 UT 47, if39 
(holding that Garrido is "[c]onsistent" with Crawford and Menzies). And at 
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least three federal circuits and seven other states have similarly held 
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness to be admissible 
under the confrontation clause. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 445 
(5th Cir. 2004); Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1980); United 
States ex rel. Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1981); People v. 
Williams, 181 P.3d 1035, 1061 (Cal.App.4th 2008); State v. Vinhaca, 205 P.3d 
649 (Haw. 2009); State v. Young, 87 P.3d 308, 316-17 (Kan. 2004); State v. 
Aaron, 218 S.W.3d 501, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Chavez v. State, 213 P.3d 476, 
479 (Nev. 2009); State v. Henderson, 136 P.3d 1005, 1011 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); 
Primeaux v. State, 88 P.3d 893, 905-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004); see also United 
States v. Williams, 116 Fed.Appx. 890, 891-92 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding 
deposition testimony admissible under confrontation clause); Simmons v. 
State, 234 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (same); People v. Yost, 749 
N.W.2d 753, 774-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (same). 
B. Pham has shown no compelling reason to depart from this 
long-established, and correct, precedent. 
Notwithstanding this extensive authority, Pham asks this Court to 
reverse a century-old course and hold that preliminary hearings- due to 
their limited purpose- are all but per se inadequate to afford a defendant 
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness "absent exceptional 
circumstances." Pet.Br. 15-16, 22. This Court should decline to do so. 
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It is true, as Pham points out, that preliminary hearings take place 
early on in a case and are generally limited to determining whether 
probable cause exists. Id. It is also true that there is no right to confront 
witnesses at preliminary hearings, and that the State may choose to present 
written statements in lieu of live testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 1102; State v. 
Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, 218 P.3d 590. 
But where the State elects to present live testimony, defendants 
do have a rule-based right to cross-examine. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(l). Where 
there is a prior opportunity to test credibility through cross-examination, 
confrontation is satisfied. See, e.g., State v. Stano, 159 P.3d 931, 945 (Kan. 
2007) (holding no confrontation violation from admission of preliminary 
hearing testimony where defendants are not barred from cross-examining 
witnesses at preliminary hearing on credibility); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 485 
(similar). 
Though Pham asserts that there "was no cross-examination regarding 
[the victim's] credibility and veracity," Pet.Br. 9, this side-steps the issue. 
The Supreme Court in Owens made clear that cross-examination need not 
even necessarily take place- the defendant need only have the opportunity 
to cross-examine. 484 U.S. at 559. Conh·ary to his assertion, id. at 19, Pham 
had that. And as shown, counsel did explore several avenues in cross, 
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including the victim's background, marital status, failure to pay hospital 
bills, interactions with police the day of the incident, relationship to those 
involved, ability to perceive, memory, and details of the incident. R291:14-
26. 
Further, however limited other preliminary hearings might be, the 
one here had those characteristics that the Green court held "closely 
approximat[ e] those that surround a typical trial" - the victim was under 
oath; Pham was represented by counsel; defense counsel had the 
opportunity to cross-examine the victim without any limitation; and the 
proceedings were held in front of a judge. Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66; see also 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 403 (holding preliminary hearing testimony reliable where 
it was "given under oath before a judge and Menzies was represented by 
counsel who had the opportunity to cross-examine" the witness). And 
tellingly, though Pham discusses potential shortfalls in preliminary hearing 
cross-examinations, Pet.Br. 19-22, he points to nothing in this case that 
counsel might have done differently. See Pham, 2016 UT App 105, iJ18 n.2 
(holding that Pham did not "identify any shortcomings in the cross-
examination actually conducted at his preliminary hearing. Rather, [he] 
siinply urged [the court of appeals] to hold, as a matter of law, that Utah 
-24-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
preliminary hearings never provide defendants with sufficient opportunity 
to cross-examine witness so as to satisfy the Confrontation Clause"). 
In pressing his position, Pham relies largely on (1) Utah's Victim 
Rights Amendments to the state constitution permitting the use of reliable 
hearsay at preliminary hearings; and (2) People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 
2004). Neither is persuasive. 
After this Court decided Brooks, the Utah Constitution was amended 
to make clear that the purpose of preliminary hearings was to determine 
probable cause, and that reliable hearsay was admissible. See Pham, 2016 
UT App 105, ~17 n.3. This overturned this Court's decision in State v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), which held that there was a state 
constitutional right to cross-examine at preliminary hearings. 
But the possibility of the State proceeding- in other cases- on 
reliable hearsay rather than live testimony at preliminary hearings does not 
affect the federal constitutional analysis. If the State had relied on affidavits 
in lieu of live testimony here, then there would have been no opportunity 
for cross-examination, and the victim's statements would not have come in 
at trial. 
Pham also cites to People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). Pet.Br. 22-26. 
But Fry is unpersuasive. There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
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because preliminary hearings in that state are limited to probable cause 
findings, they could not afford an adequate prior opportunity for cross-
examination. Id. at 977. But as shown, the Supreme Court rejected this very 
sort of reasoning as far back as Mattox and as recently as Green and Roberts. 
And whatever the limits of preliminary hearings generally, the one here 
retained the characteristics that both the United States Supreme Court and 
this Court have held most critical- an oath, a judge, a witness able to be 
cross-examined, and a defendant represented by counsel. 
Further, this Court explicitly rejected the very case on which Fry 
relied- People v. Smith, 597 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1979)-in Brooks. Fn; cited Smith 
for the proposition that "due to the limited nature of the preliminary 
hearing, the opportunity for cross-examination was insufficient to satisfy 
the Confrontation Clause." 92 P.3d at 977. Brooks argued that former rule 
of evidence 63(3)(b)(ii)-in light of Smith-showed that preliminary hearing 
testimony was inadmissible. That rule stated that hearsay statements were 
admissible if the declarant were unavailable and "the adverse party on the 
former occasion had the right and opportunity for cross-examination with 
an interest and motive similar to that which the adverse party has in the 
action in which the testimony is offered." Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541. Brooks 
argued that Smith showed that defense counsel's "motive and interest" -
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and thus opportunity to cross-examine-were different at preliminary 
hearings than at trial. Id. 
This Court disagreed- and directly rejected Smith's reasoning-
holding that defense counsel's "motive and interest are the same~' at both 
preliminary hearing and trial" and that "cross-examination takes place" at 
both "under the same motive and interest." 638 P.2d at 541. Thus, a 
preliminary hearing afforded an adequate opportunity for cross-
examination. Id.; see also Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010 (" At the preliminary 
hearing and trial, Defendant was charged with the same crimes, he had the 
same defense counsel, and the same opportunity and motive to cross-
examine" the wib1ess); State v. Mohamed, 130 P.3d 401, 405 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2006) ("Mohamed's interest at the pretrial hearing was the same as it would 
have been at trial, and equally pressing: to establish [victim's] recantation as 
credible and prove that her out of court statements were unreliable."). 
Contrary to the court of appeals' reasoning, Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ,I17 
n.3, this aspect of Brooks was unaffected by the later constitutional 
amendment permitting the use of reliable hearsay. 
Further, other courts have almost universally rejected Fry's reasoning. 
Most of the courts addressing Fry have either distinguished it or outright 
declined to follow it. This is because Fry's extreme outcome results in "a 
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blanket prohibition of preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
witness" -which the "majority ·of courts do not condone." State v. Mantz, 
222 P.3d 471,477 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009); see, e.g., People v. Thompson, case no. 
C058768, 2009 WL 4758792, *14 (Cal. App. 3d. Dec. 14, 2009) (refusing to 
follow Fry); State v. Nofoa, 349 P.3d 327, 339-40 (Haw. 2015) (refusing to 
follow Fry's "complete ban on preliminary hearing" testimony in favor of 
reviewing each decision on "case-by-case basis"); Stano, 159 P.3d at 945 
(refusing to follow Fry where defendants can cross-examine state witnesses 
at preliminary hearings and have similar motives to trial); State v. Aaron, 218 
S.W.3d 501, 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to follow FnJ despite 
defendant's admittedly different "interest and motive in his cross-
examination" at preliminary hearing); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 484-85 (refusing to 
follow Fry); Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010; (refusing to follow Fry and holding 
that counsel had same motive and interest both at preliminary hearing and 
at trial); Mohamed, 130 P.3d at 402, 404-05 (refusing to follow Fn; because 
defendant had similar motive and prior opportunity to cross-examine); see 
nlso O'Neal v. Province, 415 Fed.Appx. 921, 923-24 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
lower court because preliminary hearing afforded sufficient opportunity for 
prior cross-examination); Parker v. Jones, 423 Fed.Appx. 824, 831-32 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Hargrove, 382 Fed.Appx. 765, 779 (10th Cir. 
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2010) (affirming lower court even "if defendant's cross-examination of 
witness at the preliminary hearing was narrow in scope and would have 
been conducted differently" if counsel knew the witness would be 
unavailable at trial); Bowman v. Neal, 172 Fed.Appx. 819, 828-29 (10th Cir. 
2006) (affirming lower court's admission of preliminary hearing testilnony 
even when limitations were placed on defense counsel's prior cross-
examination). 
Pham cites a few cases from other jurisdictions purportedly following 
Fry to buoy up his claim, Pet.Br. 23-27, but they are unpersuasive for the 
same reasons that Fry itself is unpersuasive. They are also distinguishable. 
State v. Stuart, 695 N.W.2d 259 (Wis. 2005), for example, did not adopt a per 
se ban on using preliminary hearing testimony, like the Colorado court did 
in FnJ. It merely stated that when a cross-examination is in fact restricted on 
credibility issues, a confrontation problem could arise if the prosecution 
later tried to use that testimony at trial. Id.at 266. There, both parties agreed 
that the restricted preliminary hearing cross-_examination of defendant's 
brother did not satisfy the Confrontation Clause, and the court agreed. Id. at 
265. 
Coronado v. Texas, 351 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), as Pham 
acknowledges, "did not involve preliminary hearing testimony," but an 
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interview of a child witness where there was no opportunity for cross-
examination under oath. Pet.Br. 24. And Blanton v. State, 978 So.2d 149 (Fla. 
2008) involved a deposition. 
Pham also presses a number of policy arguments, none of them 
persuasive. He alleges-without citation or evidence- that if defense 
counsel were required to fully cross-examine at preliminary hearings "there 
may be little time left for judges to conduct actual trials." Pet.Br. 19. But the 
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness has been 
admissible at h·ial in Utah since Maddox, Green, or at very least, Brooks. The 
intervening decades have not created unmanageable caseloads. 
And Pham' s "assumption that there are thousands of cases" in which 
defendants "are entitled to a preliminary hearing," and that hearing them 
all would put a "burden on already strained judicial resources," Pet.Br. 19-
20, is beside the point. Having the right and exercising the right are two 
different things. The vast majority of defendants waive their preliminary 
hearings-or plead guilty, thereby waiving their confrontation right. Cf 
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (noting that 97% of federal 
convictions and 94 % of state convictions result from guilty pleas); Missouri 
v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (same); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3) (listing 
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so long-established, recent decisions affirming the admission of prior 
preliminary hearing testimony could not have created-as Pham asserts-a 
"climate of uncertainty" regarding the extent of defense counsel's duties in 
cross-examinations at preliminary hearings. Pet.Br. 20. It has long been 
certain that such testimony could be admissible if the declarant were 
unavailable, the defendant had counsel, and counsel were able to cross-
examine the witness. 
Pham also asserts that evidence discovered after the preliminary 
hearing of ten affects cross-examination at trial, and that a preliminary 
hearing conducted before all discovery is available to the defense 
necessarily renders the prior opportunity inadequate. Pet.Br. 21. But it is 
not apparent that, should such evidence arise, it would be inadmissible. 
Indeed, the victim in Garrido, though absent at trial, was extensively 
impeached with evidence obtained after the preliminary hearing. See 
Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 'if 22; see also Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541 (noting that 
defense counsel were unaware of some evidence during preliminary 
hearing, but nothing prevented counsel from presenting the inconsistency 
to the jury at trial). 
This Court also addressed that circumstance in State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 402-03 (Utah 1994). Menzies's former cell mate, Walter Britton, 
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testified at Menzies's preliminary hearing that Menzies con£ essed to killing 
the victim. Id. at 401. At trial, Britton became uncooperative and refused to 
testify, despite the court holding hiln in contempt. Id. The trial court ruled 
Britton unavailable and admitted his preliminary hearing testimony. Id. at 
401-02. 
On appeal, Menzies argued a confrontation violation, based in part 
on his inability to cross-examine Britton using convictions that occurred 
between preliminary hearing and trial. Id. at 403. This court affirmed, 
explaining that while it "agree[ d] that new evidence obtained after the 
hearing may have aided an attack on Britton' s credibility on cross-
examination, the preliminary hearing transcript indicate[d] that the issue 
was well-explored." Id. 
Pham has not met his heavy burden of convincing this Court that a 
long line of authority stretching back more than a century- and approved 
by this Court as recently as last October- has become unworkable or was 
incorrectly decided in the first instance. See generally Menzies, 889 P.2d at 
398. The correct rule is essentially a mirror image of Pham' s proposed rule. 
Pham argues that preliminary hearings as a general rule cannot afford an 
adequate opportunity for cross-examination "absent exceptional 
circumstances." Pet.Br. 22. In reality, preliminary hearing testimony of an 
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unavailable declarant is generally ad1nissible absent exceptional 
circumstances, such as where a magistrate significantly limits cross-
examination on credibility issues. 
Finally, there are important policy reasons to reject Pham' s near-
blanket approach. In fairness to the State and victims, a defendant should 
not walk free merely because a victim has become unavailable after being 
cross-examined at a preliminary hearing. As the Mattox court explained, 
"To say that a criminal ... should go scot free simply because death has 
closed the mouth of" the victim "would be carrying his constitutional 
protection to an unwarrantable extent. The law, in its wisdom, declares that 
the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order than an 
incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused." 156 U.S. at 243. 
Those "incidental benefits" included II testing the recollection and 
sifting the conscience of the witness" and II compelling him to stand face to 
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge his 
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief." Id. at 242-43. Cf Green, 399 U.S. at 160 
(rejecting confrontation claim based on admission of preliminary hearing 
testimony even though it "may be true that a jury would be in a better 
position to evaluate the truth of the prior statements if it could somehow be 
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whisked magically back in time to witness a grueling cross-examination" at 
the time of the statement). Pham likewise argues these incidental benefits 
compel a different result, Pet.Br. 19, but the Supreme Court long ago 
rejected that argument. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. 
Fairness concerns are particularly acute m domestic violence and 
gang cases, where it is lamentably common for victims to become 
uncooperative- and thus unavailable- out of fear of the defendant, a 
misplaced sense of love or loyalty, or some other factor outside the State's 
control. See, e.g., Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ~~4, 23-26 (discussing domestic 
violence victim's lack of cooperation with prosecution stemming from fear). 
C. Admitting the unavailable victim's cross-examined 
preliminary hearing testimony did not violate Pham' s 
confrontation right. 
Pham' s arguments focus almost exclusively on other cases -
precedent, possible consequences, and the like, Pet.Br. 12-29-which the 
State has responded to. But even if this Court disagrees with the State, it 
should still hold that Pham has not shown a violation of his confrontation 
right. 
Even if-as Pham contends, id. at 22-it would be a rare case in which 
a preliminary hearing would afford an adequate opportunity for cross-
examina tion, this case qualifies. Other than the lack of in-person 
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observation by the jury, id. at 19, 28 he points to no defect irt or limitation of 
the cross-examination that took place at preliminary hearing. Though he 
asserts that "discovery was not complete" at the time, id. at 28, he does not 
point to any evidence that later came to his attention that he would have 
used had the victim appeared at trial. See Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ,r,r18-19 
& n.4 (holding no confrontation violation because Pham did not allege 
changed motive between preliminary hearing and trial, trial court did not 
limit cross-examination, and Pham did II not identify any shortcomings in 
the cross-examination" at preliminary hearing). And because he has not 
identified what any of that evidence is, he has not postulated how it may 
have tipped the credibility finding in his favor. 
Likewise, he has pointed to no limitation-court- or self-imposed- on 
his actual examination, let alone one so severe that it calls into serious 
question the adequacy of his prior opportunity to cross-examine. By 
pressing issues not at issue here, Pham is essentially requesting an advisory 
opinion, which this Court is loath to issue. See UTA v. Local 382 of 
Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ip9, 289 P.3d 582 (explaining that 
Utah "courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering 
advisory opinions" when there is not a II controversy directly affect rights.") 
(citations and quotations 01nitted). But at any rate, Pha1n has not shown that 
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the preliminary hearing in his case did not afford him an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine the victim, and this Court should affirm. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted on January 4, 2017. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
JOHN J. NIELSEN 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Counsel for Respondent 
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Synopsis 
372 P.3d 734 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Appellee, 
v. 
Anh Tuan PHAM, Appellant. 
No. 20140438-CA. 
I 
May 19, 2016. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Katie Bernards-
Goodman, J., of discharge of a firearm causing serious 
bodily injury, receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, 
obstructing justice, and failing to stop or respond to an 
officer's signal. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Christiansen, J., held 
that: 
[1] admission of unavailable victim's preliminary hearing 
testimony at trial did not violate confrontation clause, and 
[2] evidence was sufficient to support finding that victim 
suffered serious bodily injury. 
Affirmed. 
Voros, J., filed opinion concurring in part and concurring 
in theresult. 
West Headnotes (7) 
[1) Criminal Law 
~ Reception of evidence 
The Court of Appeals reviews a trial 
court's decision to admit testimony that 
may implicate the confrontation clause for 
correctness. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 





G= Construction of Evidence 
Criminal Law 
(= Reasonable doubt 
The Court of Appeals will reverse a jury's 
guilty verdict due to insufficiency of the 
evidence only when the evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
is so inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crimes of which he or she was 
convicted. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
Ei= Availability of declarant 
Criminal Law 
~ Testimony at preliminary examination, 
former trial, or other proceeding 
Admission of unavailable victim's testimony 
from preliminary hearing at trial did 
not violate defendant's constitutional rights 
under confrontation clause of federal 
constitution in prosecution stemming from 
shooting incident; defendant was permitted 
to cross-examine victim during preliminary 
hearing, defendant's motivation for cross-
examination did not change between 
preliminary examination and trial, trial court 
did not limit cross-examination at preliminary 
examination in any way, and, although 
principal fact finding and determinations 
of credibility were left until trial, such 
considerations imposed no obvious structural 
limitation on scope or depth of cross-
examination defendant could conduct at 
preliminary hearing. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
t:= Availability of declarant 
Where testimonial evidence is at issue, the 
Sixth Amendment demands what the common 
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law required: unavailability of the witness and 
a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[5) Courts 
i= Erroneous or injudicious decisions 
The Court of Appeals will overrule a decision 
previously made by it only when it is 
clearly convinced that the rule was originally 
erroneous or is no longer sound due to 
changing conditions and that more good than 
harm will come by departing from precedent. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[61 Weapons 
[71 
~ Possession, Use, Carrying 
Evidence was sufficient to support finding 
that victim suffered serious bodily injury as 
result of gun shot, and therefore was sufficient 
to support conviction for unlawful discharge 
of a firearm causing serious bodily injury; 
victim was shot in the leg and spent three days 
in the hospital following the shooting, victim 
testified that he had trouble walking for about 
two weeks and experienced considerable pain 
during those two weeks, and bullet struck 
and lodged permanently in victim's leg only 
after first passing through his abdomen and 
scrotum. West's U.C.A. § 76-10-508.1. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
~ Elements of offenses 
It is within the province of the jury to 
consider the means and manner by which 
the victim's injuries were inflicted along with 
the attendant circumstances in determining 
whether a defendant caused serious bodily 
injury. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*735 Michael J. Langford, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City, Cherise M. Bacalski, and 
John J. Nielsen, for Appellee. 
Judge MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored 
this Opinion, in which Senior Judge RUSSELL W. 
BENCH concurred. 1 Judge J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. 
concurred, except as to Part II, in which he concurred in 
the result, with opinion. 
Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special 
assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah 
R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6). 
Opinion 
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge: 
,i 1 Defendant Anh Tuan Pham challenges his convictions. 
He argues that the admission of preliminary hearing 
testimony infringed upon his Confrontation Clause rights 
and that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence at 
trial to support one of the convictions. We affirm. 
*736 BACKGROUND 
,i 2 Defendant and his friend went to a convenience store to 
replenish their party supplies. The victim (Victim) and his 
girlfriend went to the same convenience store to get water 
for their baby. After they arrived, they saw Defendant 
"picking on" or "bullying" two younger men outside the 
store. Victim approached, and the younger men asked 
Victim for a ride. Defendant turned to Victim and asked 
him several times if he "wanted problems too." Victim 
responded each time that he did not. Nevertheless, the 
situation escalated. Defendant pulled out his gun and shot 
Victim; the bullet entered Victim's lower abdomen and 
exited through his scrotum, before lodging permanently in 
Victim's left leg. 
,i 3 Two police officers were across the street from the 
convenience store and, upon hearing the gunshot, ran to 
the store, yelling "stop now" and "police." Defendant 
and his friend fled in a van, later ditching it and stealing 
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an SUV whose owner had left it running. Defendant 
was apprehended later that night and was charged with 
discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury, 
receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, obstructing 
justice, and failing to stop or respond to an officer's signal. 
,r 4 Victim was taken to a hospital, where he stayed for 
three days. For two weeks, he could not walk without 
pain. Victim later returned to the hospital for further 
treatment, believing that the bullet had hit a nerve and 
caused problems in his foot. 
,r 5 Victim testified at Defendant's preliminary hearing, 
and Defendant cross-examined Victim without any 
limitation by the trial court. However, Victim moved 
to Mexico before the trial in this matter, and neither 
the United States Marshals Service nor the Mexican 
authorities were able to locate him. The State therefore 
filed a motion in limine seeking to admit Victim's 
preliminary hearing testimony. The trial court granted 
that motion over Defendant's objection. 
,I 6 At Defendant's jury trial, Victim's girlfriend, 
Defendant's friend, and the responding police officers 
testified for the State. Victim's preliminary hearing 
testimony was also read to the jury. Defendant testified in 
his own defense. The jury found Defendant guilty of all 
four charges, and Defendant timely appealed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(1] ,I 7 Defendant contends that the trial court erred 
in allowing Victim's preliminary hearing testimony to be 
read at trial, because doing so violated his constitutional 
right to confrontation. We review a trial court's decision 
to admit testimony that may implicate the Confrontation 
Clause for correctness. State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, 18, 232 
P.3d 519. 
[2] ,r 8 Defendant also contends that the State did 
not produce sufficient evidence of Victim's injuries to 
support Defendant's conviction for discharge of a firearm 
causing serious bodily injury. We will reverse a jury's 
guilty verdict due to insufficiency of the evidence only 
when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, is so inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crimes of which 
he or she was convicted. See State v. Kennedy, 2015 UT 
App 152, ,r 19, 354 P.3d 775; State v. Labrum, 2014 UT 
App 5, ,r 17,318 P.3d 1151. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Confrontation Clause 
[3] [4] ,r 9 Defendant first contends that the admission 
of Victim's preliminary hearing testimony violated his 
Confrontation Clause rights. "The Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution states in relevant part, 
'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ' 
" State v. Marks, 2011 UT App 262, ,r 13 n. 6, 262 
P.3d 13 (ellipses in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. 
VI). "Where testimonial evidence is at issue ... the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: 
unavailability [of the witness] and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination." Cra1vfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); see also State v. 
Garrido, 2013 UT App245,,I20,314P.3d 1014. Cf. *737 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 1981) (noting, 
in a pre-Crawford case, that for purposes of a hearsay 
challenge, "cross-examination takes place at preliminary 
hearing and at trial under the same motive and interest" 
because defense counsel "acts in both situations in the 
interest of and motivated by establishing the innocence of 
[his or her] client"); but see infra ,r 17 n. 3. 
,r 10 Defendant does not contest that he was given an 
opportunity to cross-examine Victim at the preliminary 
hearing, but rather that "cross examination at a 
preliminary hearing is limited in scope and opportunity 
and therefore inadequate." Furthermore, Defendant 
"admits that he was not expressly limited in his cross-
examination, but rather the nature of the preliminary 
hearing necessarily constricts confrontation." The essence 
of Defendant's argument is that preliminary hearings, 
as they are conducted under Utah law, are limited so 
as to preclude defendants from fully exercising their 
opportunity for cross-examination as guaranteed by the 
Confrontation Clause. 
,r 11 Though Defendant "requests that Utah reconsider 
its opinion" on this issue, he concedes that our appellate 
courts have determined that the opportunity to cross-
examine a witness at a preliminary hearing can satisfy 
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a defendant's right to confrontation at trial. Defendant 
cites to this court's opinion in State v. Garrido, 2013 
UT App 245, 314 P.3d 1014, which addressed the use 
of a witness's preliminary hearing testimony when that 
witness was unavailable at trial. There, the defendant's 
trial counsel chose not to cross-examine a witness at 
the preliminary hearing, likely because her preliminary 
hearing testimony contradicted her earlier statements to 
police and thus was favorable to the defendant. Id. ,r 5. 
When the witness largely failed to appear at trial, 2 her 
preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. Id. ,r 6. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the admission of the 
witness's preliminary hearing testimony violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation. Id. ,r 9. This court held 
that, under the facts of that case, "it was the opportunity 
to cross-examine [the now-unavailable witness], not the 
actual undertaking of cross-examination, that satisfied the 
requirements of Crawford." Id. ,I 20. 
2 
"[J]ust as her testimony from the preliminary hearing 
was about to be read aloud [to the jury] by a stand-in, 
[the witness] appeared in the back of the courtroom, 
shouted that she refused to testify, and fled from the 
courtroom." State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ,r 6, 
314 P.3d 1014. 
[Sf ,r 12 We will overrule a decision previously made 
by this court only when we are "clearly convinced that 
the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound 
[due to] changing conditions and that more good than 
harm will come by departing from precedent." State v. 
Tenorio, 2001 UT App 92, ,I 9, 156 P.3d 854 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant does 
not explicitly indicate under which of these paths he 
seeks abrogation of Garrido. In any event, neither Garrido 
nor Crawford state a blanket rule that an opportunity 
to cross-examine a witness at a preliminary hearing will 
always, as a matter of law, satisfy a defendant's right to 
confrontation. Rather, we understand those cases to set 
forth the general proposition that it is possible for the 
cross-examination opportunity at a preliminary hearing 
to satisfy that right. It is in this light that we consider 
Defendant's claim that Utah preliminary hearings are 
structurally limited such that defendants are denied an 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses in a manner that 
satisfies their Confrontation Clause rights. 
,I 13 Defendant states that "Confrontation requires an 
opportunity for full and unfettered cross-examination in 
order to discover and display credibility, consistency, and 
fact." He asserts that "Utah preliminary hearings provide 
an inadequate opportunity for Confrontation" because 
Utah's "preliminary hearings do not allow Judge's to 
make substantial credibility determinations, are heard in 
favor of the prosecution, whom do not have to eliminate 
alternative inferences, and do not allow a defendant 
to deeply explore issues of credibility or fact." Thus, 
according to Defendant, "testimony elicited during [Utah 
preliminary hearings] is not subject to adequate cross-
examination." 
,r 14 Defendant refers us to a Colorado case, People 
v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo.2004), which was decided 
shortly after Crawford. The Colorado Supreme Court held 
that a defendant's right to confrontation was violated 
*738 when the court admitted a deceased witness's 
preliminary hearing testimony at trial. Fry, 92 P.3d 
at 973, 981. In doing so, the court expressed concern 
that, because credibility is not an issue at a preliminary 
hearing, a defendant's cross-examination might not 
explore a witness's credibility. Id. at 977-78. The court 
explained that "allow[ing] extensive cross-examination 
by defense counsel so as to prevent any Confrontation 
Clause violations at trial if a witness were to become 
unavailable ... would turn the preliminary hearing in every 
case into a much longer and more burdensome process for 
all parties involved." Id. at 978. The Colorado Supreme 
Court noted its belief that other states had elected 
to do exactly that and, consequently, had preliminary 
hearings that amounted to mini-trials in order to provide 
defendants a full cross-examination opportunity. Id. at 
977. The court concluded that Colorado's "preliminary 
hearing [procedure] does not provide an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine sufficient to satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause requirements," and it refused to 
"expand the scope of [Colorado] preliminary hearings 
in order to allow them to satisfy Confrontation Clause 
requirements." Id. at 978. 
,I 15 Defendant "insists that Utah's preliminary hearing 
standards are essentially the same as Colorado" but 
provides no comparative analysis of Colorado and Utah 
standards. We are therefore unable to measure how 
closely Utah's preliminary hearing standards track those 
of Colorado. 
~ 16 However, Defendant does describe some facets of 
Utah's preliminary hearing process. For example, he notes 
that" 'the bindover standard [of the preliminary hearing] 
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is intended to leave the principal fact finding to the jury.' 
" (Alteration in original) (quoting State v. Virgin, 2006 
UT 29, 'iJ 21, 137 P.3d 787). Defendant also explains that 
the " 'evidentiary threshold at [the preliminary hearing] 
is relatively low' " and " 'a showing of "probable cause" 
entails only the presentation of "evidence sufficient to 
support a reasonable belief that the defendant committed 
the charged crime." ' " (Alteration in original) (quoting 
State v. Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ,r 9, 289 P.3d 444). 
And Defendant reminds us that the magistrate's role in 
assessing credibility at a preliminary hearing is limited and 
that the magistrate is to take reasonable inferences in the 
prosecution's favor. 
,r 17 These statements, while true, do not limit the 
ability of a defendant to conduct a full cross-examination 
at a preliminary hearing. Although "principal fact 
finding" and determinations of credibility are left until 
trial, such considerations impose no obvious structural 
limitation on the scope or depth of cross-examination 
a defendant may conduct at a preliminary hearing. We 
are therefore unable to conclude that cross-examinations 
conducted within Utah's preliminary hearing framework 
can never satisfy a defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 
537, 541-42 (Utah 1981) (holding that the defendants' 
opportunities for cross-examination during a preliminary 
hearing were constitutionally adequate for Confrontation 
Clause purposes, despite defense counsel being unaware 
of the witnesses' prior statements to police and thus 
being unable to cross-examine the witnesses about 
those statements, because defense counsel "apparently 
advisedly and intentionally decided to refrain" from cross-
examining the witnesses about the challenged topics). 3 
3 On the other hand, we are also not convinced 
that a preliminary hearing always provides the 
opportunity for cross-examination guaranteed by 
the Confrontation Clause. The State filed a letter 
of supplemental authority pursuant to rule 24(j) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, citing 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 1981), 
for the proposition that "cross-examination takes 
place at preliminary hearing and at trial under the 
same motive and interest." We note that counsel's 
possession of the same motive and interest in 
conducting cross-examination does not necessarily 
mean counsel had the same opportunity to cross-
examine. See Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ~ 20, 314 
P.3d 1014 ("We conclude that it was the opportunity 
to cross-examine ... , not the actual undertaking of 
cross-examination, that satisfied the requirements 
of Crawford"). Indeed, the Brooks court separately 
considered whether "certain omissions in cross-
examination at preliminary hearing precluded [the 
defendants] from an adequate exercise of the right to 
confrontation." Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541. 
Moreover, thirteen years after Brooks was issued, 
the nature of preliminary hearings in Utah was 
changed by the passage of the Utah Victims' 
Rights Amendment. As relevant here, the Utah 
Constitution was amended to provide that "[w]here 
the def end ant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is 
limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists" and to provide that "reliable hearsay 
evidence" is admissible at a preliminary hearing. 
See Utah Const. art. I, § 12. In light of these 
changes, the Utah Supreme Court overruled State 
v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), upon which 
the relevant portion of Brooks had partially relied. 
See State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ,r,r 14--16, 218 
P .3d 590. It is therefore unclear whether Brooks's 
blanket statement that "cross-examination takes 
place at preliminary hearing and at trial under 
the same motive and interest" is still true insofar 
as Confrontation Clause rights are concerned. See 
Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541. 
*739 1 18 We need not decide today whether the inverse is 
true. It is true that some courts have considered changes in 
a defendant's motive to cross-examine and court-imposed 
limitations on cross-examination as factors relevant to 
determining whether a def end ant had a full opportunity 
to cross-examine a witness during a preliminary hearing. 
See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsda/l, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 
106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (holding that "[by] 
cutting off all questioning about an event that the State 
conceded had taken place and that a jury might reasonably 
have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the 
prosecution in his testimony, the court's ruling violated 
[the defendant's] rights secured by the Confrontation 
Clause"); State v. Henderson, 2006--NMCA-059, 119, 139 
N.M. 595, 136 P.3d 1005 (concluding that a defendant's 
right to confrontation was not violated where he had 
the same motive to cross-examine the witness at the 
preliminary hearing and enjoyed "an unrestricted right 
to cross-examine" the witness); State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 
47, ,r 38, 279 Wis.2d 659, 695 N.W.2d 259 (vacating a 
defendant's conviction where a court "did not allow [the 
defendant] to cross-examine [a witness] at the preliminary 
hearing about the effect the pending charges had on his 
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decision to cooperate"). In the case before us, however, 
Defendant does not allege that his motivation to cross-
examine Victim changed between the preliminary hearing 
and trial. Nor does he <;:laim that the trial court limited his 
cross-examination in any way. Under the circumstances 
of this case, we cannot conclude that Defendant was 
prevented from exercising his Confrontation Clause right 
to, in Defendant's words, "unfettered cross-examination 
in order to discover and display credibility, consistency, 
and fact." 4 
4 On appeal, Defendant does not identify any 
shortcomings in the cross-examination actually 
conducted at his preliminary hearing. Rather, 
Defendant simply urges us to hold, as a matter of 
law, that Utah preliminary hearings never provide 
defendants with sufficient opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses so as to satisfy the Confrontation 
Clause. 
,r 19 Defendant has not demonstrated that Utah's 
preliminary hearing procedures limit cross-examination 
of a witness in such a way that a defendant's 
Confrontation Clause rights are necessarily violated if that 
witness's testimony is read at trial due to the witness's 
unavailability. Defendant does not claim that the specific 
circumstances of his preliminary hearing resulted in such 
a limitation. Consequently, we hold that the court did not 
err in allowing Victim's preliminary hearing testimony to 
be read to the jury at trial. 
II. Serious Bodily Injury 
[6) ,r 20 Defendant next contends that the State did 
not provide sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude 
that Victim suffered serious bodily injury. Specifically, he 
argues that there was no evidence that the gunshot created 
a substantial risk of death. 
if 21 Defendant was convicted of the first degree felony 
of unlawful discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily 
injury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508.1 (LexisNexis 
2012). The Utah Criminal Code defines serious bodily 
injury as "bodily injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment 
of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a 
substantial risk of death." Id.§ 76-1-601(11). We consider 
only the third criterion-substantial risk of death. 5 
5 The State argues that the jury could also have found 
that the evidence of Victim's injuries satisfied the 
"protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily member or organ" prong, on the ground 
that two weeks was a protracted length of time. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11) (LexisNexis 2012). 
Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient 
to support a jury finding of "substantial risk of 
death," we need not address that argument. 
*740 [71 if 22 "[I]t is within the province of the 
jury to consider the means and manner by which the 
victim's injuries were inflicted along with the attendant 
circumstances in determining whether a defendant caused 
serious bodily injury." State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 
3, if 18, 63 P.3d 110 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). In addressing an insufficiency-of-the-evidence 
claim, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State v. Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, ,r 39, 354P.3d 
775. 
if 23 Defendant admits that Victim's preliminary hearing 
testimony described his being shot in the leg, bleeding, 
feeling dizzy, spending three days in a hospital, having 
trouble walking for about two weeks, and experiencing 
considerable pain during those two weeks. Defendant 
neglects to mention that Victim also testified that the 
bullet struck and lodged permanently in his leg only after 
first passing through Victim's abdomen and scrotum. See 
State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, iJ 31, 318 P.3d 
238 (noting that marshaling the evidence is "prudent 
tactical advice" because, generally, "[a]n appellant cannot 
demonstrate that the evidence supporting a factual finding 
falls short without giving a candid account of that 
evidence."). 
if 24 Defendant does not refer us to any case in which an 
appellate court has determined that evidence of a gunshot 
wound was insufficient to support a jury's finding. Rather, 
he cites a single case in which a defendant beat his victim 
into unconsciousness, stomped on the victim's head, and 
ripped out the victim's eyebrow ring. Bloomfield, 2003 UT 
App 3, il 3, 63 P.3d 110. There, this court held that the 
evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to support the 
jury's finding that the defendant had caused serious bodily 
injury. Id. ,r 18. 
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,r 25 Defendant baldly asserts that his case "simply does 
not present facts" like those in Bloomfield and that the 
jury's finding of serious bodily injury here therefore must 
have been unreasonable. But he does not argue that 
Bloomfield marks the boundary between bodily injury and 
serious bodily injury. Thus, the fact that the evidence of 
a severe beating in that case was sufficient to sustain the 
jury's finding of serious bodily injury has no bearing on 
Defendant's claim that the evidence of a shooting in his 
case was not sufficient for the jury to find that he caused 
serious bodily injury. 
,r 26 In any event, Defendant fails to cite any authority 
suggesting that gunshot wounds do not or cannot create 
a substantial risk of death. On the contrary, a cursory 
search reveals several cases in which gunshot wounds to 
the leg have been fatal. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Lafler, No. 
l l-cv-11250, 2015 WL 2185970, at *1 (E.D.Mich. May 
11, 2015) (after being shot in the leg, the victim ran away 
to take refuge in a house, where he died from blood loss); 
Ostling v. City of Bainbridge Island, 872 F.Supp.2d 1117, 
1121 (W.D.Wash.2012) (a man was shot in the leg and 
then bled to death); People v. Payton, No. 257402, 2006 
WL 548917, at *1-2 (Mich.Ct.App. Mar. 7, 2006) (per 
curiam) (noting that a def end ant shot a victim in the leg, 
that "the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause 
death or great bodily harm," and that the victim did in 
fact die). Even if the wound is not directly fatal, a gunshot 
to any part of the body can cause infections that lead to 
death. See, e.g., People v. Fedora, 393 Ill. 165, 65 N.E.2d 
447, 455-56 (1946) (two doctors' opinions that a victim's 
death had been caused by peritonitis resulting from a 
gunshot wound were "sufficient evidence" to support a 
jury finding that the shooter was responsible for causing 
death); State v. Davis, 317 Mo. 272, 295 S.W. 96, 97-
98 (1927) (testimony from two doctors that a victim's 
death had been caused by peritonitis resulting from being 
shot in the abdomen by the defendant approximately two 
months before death was "amply sufficient to support the 
verdict" of manslaughter); see also, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 
16 N.C.App. 330, 192 S.E.2d 24, 25 (1972) (considering 
the admissibility of a doctor's opinion that a victim died 
from "pneumonia [that] was secondary to the peritonitis 
which was secondary to the gunshot wound."); State 
v. Nix, No. C-030696, 2004 WL 2315035, at paras. 3, 
16 (Ohio Ct.App. *741 Oct. 15, 2004) (victim died in 
hospital, after being shot in the abdomen, from "acute 
ischemic colitis with peritonitis" or "dying bowel due to 
inadequate vascular supply due to injur[ed] vessels due 
to gunshot wound" (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Adams v. State, 150 Tex.Crim. 431, 202 S. W.2d 933, 934 
(1947) (noting that a decedent's death from peritonitis was 
traceable to a gunshot wound caused by the defendant, 
who was therefore guilty of capital murder). Because being 
shot can lead to death, it is not inherently unreasonable for 
a jury to find that a particular shooting resulted in serious 
bodily injury by creating a substantial risk of death. 
,r 27 We will vacate a defendant's conviction after a jury 
trial due to the insufficiency of the evidence only if we 
determine that the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant committed 
the crime of which he or she was convicted. State v. 
Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, if 39, 354 P.3d 775. Defendant 
has not demonstrated that a reasonable jury, after hearing 
evidence that Defendant fired a bullet that penetrated 
Victim's abdomen, scrotum, and leg, causing Victim to 
be hospitalized for three days, must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt as to whether Defendant created a 
substantial risk of death. 
CONCLUSION 
,r 28 The trial court did not err by admitting Victim's 
preliminary hearing testimony to be read to the jury 
after determining that Victim was unavailable, because 
Defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine Victim 
at the preliminary hearing. Defendant has failed to show 
that the evidence was insufficient to support a jury finding 
that Victim suffered serious bodily injury. 
,r 29 Affirmed. 
VOROS, Judge (concurring in part and concurring in the 
result in part): 
,r 30 I concur in the majority opinion except as to Part II, 
in which I concur in the result only. 
1 31 I would reject Pham's sufficiency challenge on 
marshaling grounds. True, our marshaling rule no 
longer requires the appellant to present "every scrap of 
competent evidence" supporting the verdict. See State v. 
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, il 43, 326 P.3d 645. But an appellant 
still bears the burden of persuasion. Id ,I 42. And to 
persuade a court that an injury was not so serious as to 
WESTLAW © 20·16 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Pham, 372 P.3d 734 (2016) 
2016 UT App 105 
satisfy the statutory definition of "serious bodily injury" 
an appellant must at minimum accurately describe the 
injury. 
,r 32 Here, Pham argues that Victim did not suffer serious 
bodily injury without acknowledging all the bodily injury 
Victim suffered. Pham states that Victim "testified that 
the bullet struck his leg." In fact, the record shows that 
the bullet produced three wounds: it entered Victim's 
body above his penis on the right side, passed through 
End of Document 
his scrotum on his left side, and lodged in his leg. The 
first two wounds are not mere "scraps" of evidence; they 
are additional evidence that Victim's injury qualified as 
serious. Without acknowledging them, Pham cannot show 
that the evidence of serious bodily injury fell short. 
AH Citatfons 
372 P.3d 734, 2016 UT App 105 
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Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights, USCA CONST Amend .... 
United States Code Annotated 
Constitution of the United States 
Annotated 
Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury trials 
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
Currentness 
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in three separate documents. Notes of Decisions for 
subdivisions I through XX are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXI 
through XXIX, see the second document for Amend. VI. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXX through 
XXXIII, see the third document for Amend. VI.> 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury trials, USCA CONST Amend. VI-Jury trials 
Current through P.L. 114-254. Also includes P.L. 114-256. 
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Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons], UT CONST Art. 1, § 12 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I. Declaration of Rights 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
Currentness 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and def end in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have 
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that examination is limited 
to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary 
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Credits 
Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995. 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12, UT CONST Art. 1, § 12 
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session. 
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